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1. Introduction 
With the development of network, data collection and storage technology, the use and 
sharing of large amounts of data has become possible. Once the data and information 
accumulated , it will become the wealth of information. Data mining, otherwise known as 
knowledge discovery, can extracted “meaningful information” or “knowledge” from the large 
amounts of data, so supports people’s decision-making (Han & Kamber, 2006). However, 
traditional data mining techniques and algorithms directedly opreated on the original data 
set, which will cause the leakage of privacy data. At the same time, large amounts of data 
implicates the sensitive knowledge that their disclosure can not be ingored to the 
competitiveness of enterprise. These problems challenge the traditional data mining, so 
privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) has become one of the newest trends in privacy 
and security and data mining research. 
In privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), data mining algorithms are analyzed for the 
side-effects they incur in data privacy, and the main objective in privacy preserving data 
mining is to develop algorithms for modifying the original data in some way, so that the 
private data and private knowledge remain private even after the mining process (Verykios 
et al., 2004a). A number of techniques such as Trust Third Party, Data perturbation 
technique, Secure Multiparty Computation and game theoretic approach, have been 
suggested in recent years in order to perform privacy preserving data mining.  
However, most of these privacy preserving data mining algorithms such as the Secure 
Multiparty Computation technique, were based on the assumption of a semi-honest 
environment, where the participating parties always follow the protocol and never try to 
collude. As mentioned in previous works on privacy-preserving distributed mining (Lindell 
& Pinkas, 2002), it is rational for distributed data mining that the participants are assumed 
to be semi-honest, but the collusion of parties for gain additional benefits can not be 
avoided. So there has been a tendency for privacy preserving data mining to devise the 
collusion resistant protocols or algorithms, recent research have addressed this issue, and 
protocols or algorithms based on penalty function mechanism, the Secret Sharing 
Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold Cryptography are given (Kargupta et al.,2007 ; 
Jiang et al., 2008; Emekci et al., 2007). 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related concepts of the 
PPDM problem. In Section 3, we describe some techniques for privacy preserving data 
mining In Section 4, we discuss the collussion behaviors in Privacy Preserving Data Mining. 
Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
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2. The related concepts of PPDM 
The concept of privacy is often more complex, In particular, in data mining, the definition of 
privacy preservation is refered to “getting valid data mining results without learning the 
underlying data values.”(Clifton et al., 2002a), and (Stanley et al., 2004) also indicated PPDM 
encompasses the dual goal of meeting privacy requirements and providing valid data 
mining results, so the definition emphasizes the dilemma of balancing privacy preservation 
and knowledge disclosure. 
2.1 Defining privacy preservation in data mining 
Privacy-preserving data mining considers the problem of running data mining algorithms 
on confidential data that is not supposed to be revealed even to the party running the 
algorithm. The main consideration of PPDM is two fold (Verykios et al., 2004a). First, 
sensitive raw data like identifiers,names, addresses and so on, should be modified or 
trimmed out from the original database, in order for the recipient of the data not to be able 
to compromise another person’s privacy. Second, sensitive knowledge which can be mined 
from a database by using data mining algorithms, should also be excluded, because such a 
knowledge can equally well compromise data privacy. So, privacy preservation occurs in 
two major dimensions: users’ personal information and information concerning their 
collective activity. the former is referred to individual privacy preservation and the latter is 
refferred to collective privacy preservation (Stanley et al., 2004). 
• Individual privacy preservation: The primary goal of data privacy is the protection of 
personally identifiable information. In general, information is considered personally 
identifiable if it can be linked, directly or indirectly, to an individual person. Thus, 
when personal data are subjected to mining, the attribute values associated with 
individuals are private and must be protected from disclosure. Miners are then able to 
learn from global models rather than from the characteristics of a particular individual. 
• Collective privacy preservation: Protecting personal data may not be enough. 
Sometimes, we may need to protect against learning sensitive knowledge representing 
the activities of a group. We refer to the protection of sensitive knowledge as collective 
privacy preservation. The goal here is quite similar to that one for statistical databases, 
in which security control mechanisms provide aggregate information about groups and, 
at the same time, should prevent disclosure of confidential information about 
individuals. However, unlike as is the case for statistical databases, another objective of 
collective privacy preservation is to preserve strategic pattern that are paramount for 
strategic decisions, rather than minimizing the distortion of all statistics. In other words, 
the goal here is not only to protect personally identifiable information but also some 
patterns and trends that are not supposed to be discovered. 
Privacy Preservation in Data Mining has some limitations: Privacy Preservation Data Mining 
techniques do not mean pefect privacy, for example, The SMC computation won’t reveal the 
sensitive data, but the data mining result will enable all parties to estimate the value of the 
sensitive data. It isn’t that the SMC was “broken”, but that the result itself violates privacy. 
2.2 Data distribution 
In PPDM, How are the data available for mining: are they centralized or distributed across 
many sites? With distributed data, the way the data is distributed also plays an important 
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role in defining the problem. The different partitioning poses different problems and can 
lead to different algorithms for privacy-preserving data mining.  
Distributed data scenarios can be classified as horizontal data distribution and vertical data 
distribution (Verykios et al., 2004a). Horizontal distribution refers to these cases where 
different database records reside in different places, while vertical data distribution, refers 
to the cases where all the values for different attributes reside in different places. 
2.3 Models of PPDM 
In the study of privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), there are mainly four models as 
follows: 
1. Trust Third Party Model 
The goal standard for security is the assumption that we have a trusted third party to whom 
we can give all data. The third party performs the computation and delivers only the results 
– except for the third party, it is clear that nobody learns anything not inferable from its own 
input and the results. The goal of secure protocols is to reach this same level of privacy 
preservation, without the problem of finding a third party that everyone trusts. 
2. Semi-honest Model 
In the semi-honest model, every party follows the rules of the protocol using its correct 
input, but after the protocol is free to use whatever it sees during execution of the protocol 
to compromise security. 
3. Malicious Model 
In the malicious model, no restrictions are placed on any of the participants. Thus any party 
is completely free to indulge in whatever actions it pleases. In general, it is quite difficult to 
develop efficient protocols that are still valid under the malicious model. However, the 
semi-honest model does not provide sufficient protection for many applications.  
4. Other Models - Incentive Compatibility 
While the semi-honest and malicious models have been well researched in the 
cryptographic community, other models outside the purview of cryptography are possible. 
One example is the interesting economic notion of incentive compatibility. A protocol is 
incentive compatible if it can be shown that a cheating party is either caught or else suffers 
an economic loss. Under the rational model of economics, this would serve to ensure that 
parties do not have any advantage by cheating. Of course, in an irrational model, this would 
not work.  
We remark, in the “real world”, there is no external party that can be trusted by all parties, 
so the Trust Third Party Model is a ideal model. 
2.4 Evaluation of privacy preserving algorithms 
An important aspect in the development and assessment of algorithms and tools, for privacy 
preserving data mining is the identification of suitable evaluation criteria and the 
development of related benchmarks. It is often the case that no privacy preserving algorithm 
exists that outperforms all the others on all possible criteria. Rather, an algorithm may 
perform better that another one on specific criteria, such as performance and/or data utility. 
It is thus important to provide users with a set of metrics which will enable them to select 
the most appropriate privacy preserving technique for the data at hand, with respect to 
some specific parameters they are interested in optimizing. 
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A preliminary list of evaluation parameters to be used for assessing the quality of privacy 
preserving data mining algorithms, is given below: (Verykios et al., 2004a) 
• the performance of theney, proposed algorithms in terms of time requirements, that is 
the time needed by each algorithm to hide a specified set of sensitive information; 
• the data utility after the application of the privacy preserving technique, which is 
equivalent with the minimization of the information loss or else the loss in the 
functionality of the data; 
• the level of uncertainty with which the sensitive information that have been hidden can 
still be predicted; 
• the resistance accomplished by the privacy algorithms, to different data mining 
techniques. 
3. Privacy preserving data mining techniques 
Data mining includes various algorithms such as classification, association rule mining, and 
clustering. In recent years, a number of techniques have been proposed to preserve privacy. 
Privacy preserving data mining techniques can be classified by different assumptions or 
domain knowledge.for example, data distribution, data modification, data mining 
algorithm, data or rule hiding, privacy preservation (Verykios et al., 2004a). In this section, 
we will introduce some mainly privacy preserving data mining techniques, which include 
the Trust Party tehnique, randomization technique, Secure Multiparty Computation and 
anonymity techniques. 
3.1 The trust party tehnique 
The typical approach to data mining of distributed privacy preserving data is to build a data 
warehouse containing all the data, then mine the warehouse. This requires that the 
warehouse be trusted to maintain the privacy of all parties - since it knows the source of 
data, it learns site specific information as well as global results. For privacy preserving data 
mining, if we can find a fully trusted third party, then all parties give their input to the trust 
third party, and the trust third party computes the output and returns it to the parties. For 
example, current e-commerce transactions have a trusted (central) third party with access to 
all the information. The “trust” is governed by legal contracts enjoining the improper release 
of information. In some cases, the third party is dispensed with and contracts exist between 
the interested parties themselves. This is obviously insecure from the technical perspective.  
Trusted third parties are, however, difficult to find, especially when the number of 
participants increases. Though SMC enables this without the trusted third party, but the 
computation and/or communication required may be high. so the protocols obtained by this 
general construction are inefficient and useless in the case of a large number of participants. 
Other factors, such as the need for continual online availability of the parties, create further 
restrictions and problems in realworld settings such as a web-based survey. So we need to 
extend the fully trusted party technique. For example, refernce (Gilburd et al., 2004) 
proposed a new privacy model: k-privacy --by means of an innovative, yet natural 
generalization of the accepted trusted third party model. This allows implementing 
cryptographically secure efficient primitives for real-world large scale distributed systems. 
As an example for the usefulness of the proposed model, we employ k-privacy to introduce 
a technique for obtaining knowledge --by way of an association-rule mining algorithm from 
large-scale data basement, while ensuring that the privacy is cryptographically secure. 
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3.2 Data perturbation technique 
Data perturbation technique, first proposed in (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000), represents one 
common approach in privacy preserving data mining, where the original (private) dataset is 
perturbed and the result is released for data analysis. Data perturbation includes a wide 
variety of techniques including (but not limited to): additive, multiplicative (Kim & Winkler, 
2003), matrix multiplicative, k-anonymization (Sweeney, 2002), micro-aggregation (Li & 
Sarkar, 2006), categorical data perturbation (Verykios, 2004b), data swapping (Fienberg & 
McIntyre, 2004), resampling (Liew, 1985), data shuffling (Muralidhar & Sarathy, 2006). Now 
we mostly focus on two types of data perturbation that apply to continuous data: additive 
and matrix multiplicative, other detailed data perturbation techniques can refer to the 
related literatures.  
3.2.1 Additive perturbation 
The additive perturbation is a technique for privacy-preserving data mining in which noise is 
added to the data in order to mask the attribute values of records (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000). 
The noise added is sufficiently large so that individual record values cannot be recovered. 
Therefore, techniques are designed to derive aggregate distributions from the perturbed 
records. Subsequently, data mining techniques can be developed in order to work with these 
aggregate distributions. The method of randomization can be described as follows.  
Consider a set of data records denoted by { }1 2, , , NX x x x= " . For record ix X∈ , we add a 
noise component which is drawn fromthe probability distribution ( )Yf y . These noise 
components are drawn independently, and are denoted 1 2{ , , }NY y y y= " . Thus, the new set 
of distorted records are denoted by 1 1 , N Nx y x y+ +" . We denote this new set of records by 
1{ , }NZ z z= " . So the data owner replaces the original dataset X  with Z X Y= + . where Y  
is a noise matrix with each column generated independently from a n-dimensional random 
vector Y with mean vector zero. As is commonly done, we assume throughout that 
Y∑ equals 2Iσ , i.e., the entries of Y were generated independently from some distribution 
with mean zero and variance 2σ  (typical choices for this distribution include Gaussian and 
uniform). In this case, Y is sometimes referred to as additive white noise. Thus, the original 
records cannot be recovered, but the distribution of the original records can be recovered. 
3.2.2 Matrix multiplicative perturbation  
The most common method of data perturbation is that of additive perturbations. However, 
matrix multiplicative perturbations can also be used to good effect for privacy-preserving 
data mining. 
The data owner replaces the original data X  with Y MX= where M is an n n′× matrix 
chosen to have certain useful properties. If M is orthogonal ( n n′ = n and TM M I= ), then 
the perturbation exactly preserves Euclidean distances, i.e., for any columns 1 2,x x  in 
X ,their corresponding columns 1 2,y y  in Y  satisfy 1 2 1 2x x y y− = − . If each entry of M  
is generated independently from the same distribution with mean zero and variance 2σ ( n′  
not necessarily equal to n ), then the perturbation approximately preserves Euclidean 
distances on expectation up to constant factor 2nσ ′ . If M is the product of a discrete cosine 
transformation matrix and a truncated perturbation matrix, then the perturbation 
approximately preserves Euclidean distances. 
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3.2.3 Evaluation of data perturbation technique 
The data perturbation technique have the benefits of efficiency, and does not require 
knowledge of the distribution of other records in the data. This is not true of other methods 
such as k-anonymity which require the knowledge of other records in the data. this 
technique does not require the use of a trusted server containing all the original records in 
order to perform the anonymization process. While this is a strength of the data 
perturbation technique, it also leads to some weaknesses, since it treats all records equally 
irrespective of their local density. Therefore, outlier records are more susceptible to 
adversarial attacks as compared to records in more dense regions in the data. In order to 
guard against this, one may need to be needlessly more aggressive in adding noise to all the 
records in the data. This reduces the utility of the data for mining purposes. 
Reference (Liu et al., 2006) provides a detailed survey of attack techniques on the data 
perturbation, especially additive and matrix multiplicative perturbation. These attacks offer 
insights into vulnerabilities data perturbation techniques under certain circumstances. In 
summary, the following information could lead to disclosure of private information from 
the perturbed data. 
1. Attribute Correlation: Many real world data has strong correlated attributes, and this 
correlation can be used to filter off additive white noise.  
2. Known Sample: Sometimes, the attacker has certain background knowledge about the 
data such as the p.d.f. or a collection of independent samples which may or may not overlap 
with the original data.  
3. Known Inputs/Outputs: Sometimes, the attacker knows a small set of private data and 
their perturbed counterparts. This correspondence can help the attacker to estimate other 
private data. 
4. Data Mining Results: The underlying pattern discovered by data mining also provides a 
certain level of knowledgewhich can be used to guess the private data to a higher level of 
accuracy.  
5. SampleDependency: Most of the attacks assume the data as independent samples from 
some unknown distribution. This assumption may not hold true for all real applications. For 
certain types of data, such as the time series data, there exists auto correlation/dependency 
among the samples. How this dependency can help the attacker to estimate the original data 
is still an open problem. 
At the same time, a “privacy/accuracy” trade-off is faced for the data perturbation 
technique. On the one hand, perturbation must not allow the original data records to be 
adequately recovered. On the other, it must allow “patterns” in the original data to be 
mined. 
Data perturbation technique is needed for situations where accessing the original form of 
the data attributes is mandatory. It happens when, for instance, some conventional off-the-
shelf data analysis techniques are to be applied. While this approach is more generic, some 
inaccuracy in the analysis result is to be expected. 
3.2.4 Application of the data perturbation technique 
The randomization method has been extended to a variety of data mining problems. 
Refercence (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000) firstly discussed how to use the approach for solving 
the privacy preserving classification problem classification. Refercence (Zhang et al. 2005; 
Zhu & Liu, 2004) have also proposed a number of other techniques which seem to work well 
over a variety of different classifiers.  
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There has been research considering preserving privacy for other type of data mining. For 
instance, reference (Evfimievski et al., 2002) proposed a solution to the privacy preserving 
distributed association mining problem.The problem of association rules is especially 
challenging because of the discrete nature of the attributes corresponding to presence or 
absence of items. In order to deal with this issue, the randomization technique needs to be 
modified slightly. Instead of adding quantitative noise, random items are dropped or 
included with a certain probability. The perturbed transactions are then used for aggregate 
association rule mining. The randomization approach has also been extended to other 
applications, for example, SVD based collaborative filtering (Polat & Du, 2005). 
3.3 Secure multiparty computation technique 
3.3.1 Background 
In privacy preserving distributed data mining, two or more parties owning confidential 
databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases without 
revealing any unnecessary information. For example, consider separate medical institutions 
that wish to conduct a joint research while preserving the privacy of their patients. One way 
to view this is to imagine a trusted third party-- everyone gives their input to the trusted 
party, who performs the computation and sends the results to the participants. However, 
this is exactly what we don't want to do, for example, hospitals are not allowed to hand their 
raw data out, security agencies cannot afford the risk, and governments risk citizen outcry if 
they do. Thus, the question is how to compute the results without having a trusted party, 
and in a way that reveals nothing but the final results of the data mining computation. 
Secure Multiparty Computation enables this without the trusted third party. The concept of 
Secure Multiparty Computation was introduced in (Yao, 1986) and has been proved that 
there is a secure multi-party computation solution for any polynomial function 
(Goldreich,1998). The basic idea of Secure Multiparty Computation is that a computation is 
secure if at the end of the computation, no party knows anything except its own input and 
the results. This approach was first introduced to the data mining community by Lindell 
and Pinkas (Lindell & Pinkas, 2002), with a method that enabled two parties to build a 
decision tree without either party learning anything about the other party's data, except 
what might be revealed through the final decision tree. Now this technique  have been 
developed for association rules, clustering, k-nearest neighbor classification, and are 
working on others. 
Allowed adversarial behavior: there are two main types of adversaries. (Lindell & Pinkas, 
2002) 
a. Semi-honest adversaries: In semi-honest adversarial model, it correctly follows the 
protocol specification, yet attempts to learn additional information by analyzing the 
transcript of messages received during the execution. This is a ratherweak adversarial 
model. However, there are some settings where it can realistically modelthe threats to 
the system. Semi-honest adversaries are also called “honest-but-curious”and “passive”. 
b. Malicious adversaries: In malicious adversarial model , a party may arbitrarily deviate 
from the protocol specification .In general, providing security in the presence of 
malicious adversaries is preferred, as it ensures that no adversarial attack can succeed. 
Malicious adversaries are also called “active”. 
We remark that although the semi-honest adversarial model is far weaker than the 
malicious model, it is often a realistic one. This is because deviating from a specified 
program which may be buried in a complex application is a non-trivial task. 
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3.3.2 Techniques for building secure multiparty computation protocols 
In this section,we describe here some simple protocols that are often used as basic building 
blocks, or primitives, of secure computation protocols. 
Oblivious Transfer: Oblivious transfer is a simple functionality involving two parties. It is a 
basic building block of many cryptographic protocols for secure computation. The notion  
of 1-out-2 oblivious transfer was suggested by (Even et al., 1985) (as a variant of a different 
but equivalent type of oblivious transfer that has been suggested by (Rabin, 1981)). The 
protocol involves two parties, the sender and the receiver. and its functionality is defined as 
follows: 
• Input: The sender's input is a pair of strings 0 1( , )x x  and the receiver's input is a bit 
{0,1}σ ∈ . 
• Output: The receiver's output is xσ (and nothing else), while the sender has no output. 
In other words, 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer implements the function 0 1(( , ), ) ( , )x x xσσ λ6 , 
where λ denotes the empty string (i.e., no output). 
Oblivious transfer protocols have been designed based on virtually all known assumptions 
which are used to construct specific trapdoor functions (i.e. public key cryptosystems), and 
also based on generic assumptions such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. 
There are simple and eficient protocols for oblivious transfer which are secure only against 
semi-honest adversaries (Even et al., 1985). 
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation:The problem of “oblivious polynomial evaluation” (OPE) 
involves a sender and a receiver. The sender’s input is a polynomial Q  of degree k over 
some finite field F ,  namely a polynomial 
0
( )
k i
ii
Q z a z==∑ (the degree k of the polynomial, 
wis public). The receiver’s input is an element . The protocol is such that the receiver obtains 
( )Q z without learning anything else about the polynomial Q ,  and the sender learns 
nothing. That is, the problem considered is the private computation of the function 
( , ) ( , ( ))Q z Q zλ6 .where λ is the empty output. 
The major motivation for oblivious polynomial evaluation is the fact that the output of a 
k egree random polynomial is 1k + wise independent; this is very useful in the construction 
of cryptographic protocols. Another motivation is that polynomials can be used for 
approximating functions that are defined over the Real numbers. 
Homomorphic Encryption:A homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme 
which allows certain algebraic operations to be carried out on the encrypted plaintext, by 
applying an eficient operation to the corresponding ciphertext. In particular, we will be 
interested in additively homomorphic encryption schemes (Paillier ,1999) that is comparable 
with the encryption process of RSA in terms of the computation cost, while the decryption 
process of the additive homomorphism is faster than the decryption process of RSA. 
An additively homomorphic cryptosystem has the nice property that for two plain text 
message 1m  and 2m , it holds 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )e m e m e m m× = + ,where ×  denotes multiplication. 
This essentially means that we can have the sum of two numbers without knowing what 
those numbers are. Moreover, because of the property of associativity,  
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s se m m m e m e m e m+ + + = × × ×" " , where ( ) 0ie m ≠ .  
And we can easily have the following corollary: 2 11 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )
m me m e m e m m= = ×  
An eficient implementation of an additive homomorphic encryption scheme with semantic 
security was given by Paillier (Paillier ,1999). 
www.intechopen.com
Privacy Preserving Data Mining   
 
543 
Threshold decryption: Threshold decryption is an example of a multiparty functionality. The 
setting includes m parties and an encryption scheme. It is required that any m m′ < of the 
parties are able to decrypt messages, while any coalition of strictly less than m′ parties learns 
nothing about encrypted messages. This functionality can, of course, be implemented using 
generic constructions, but there are specific constructions implementing it for almost any 
encryption scheme, and these are far more eficient than applying the generic constructions to 
compute this function ality. Interestingly, threshold decryption of homomorphic encryption 
can be used as a primitive for constructing a very eficient generic protocol for secure 
multiparty computation, with a communication overhead of only ( )O mk c bits (Franklin & 
Haber (1996) for a construction secure against semi-honest adversaries, and Cramer et al. 
(2001) for a construction secure against malicious adversaries). 
Other Cryptographic Tools: 
Many basic security operations now have been applied to Secure protocols of privacy 
preserving data mining, such as Secure Sum, Secure Set, Secure Size of Set Intersection 
Union, Scalar Product (Clifton et al., 2002b).. 
3.3.3 Application of the secure multiparty computation technique 
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) technique is a common approach for distributed 
privacy preserving data mining, and now has been extended to a variety of data mining 
problems. For example, Lindell & Pinkas (2002) introduced a secure multi-party 
computation technique for classification using the ID3 algorithm, over horizontally 
partitioned data. Specifically, they consider a scenario in which two parties owning 
confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases, 
without revealing any unnecessary information. Du & Zhan (2002) proposed a protocol for 
making the ID3 algorithm privacy-preserving over vertically partitioned data. Vaidya & 
Clifton (2002) presented the component scalar product protocol for privacy-preserving 
association rule mining over vertically partitioned data in the case of two parties; Wright & 
Yang (2004) applied homomorphic encryption to the Bayesian networks induction for the 
case of two parties. Zhan et al., (2007) proposed a cryptographic approach to tackle 
collaborative association rule mining among multiple parties. 
3.3.4 Common errors of the secure multiparty computation  
There are common errors which often occur when designing secure protocols, here we 
would like to use this section to introduce some of these errors briefly, interested reader can 
refer to (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009).  
• Semi-honest Behavior does not Preclude Collusions: Assuming that adversaries are 
semi-honest does not ensure that no two parties collude. The “semi-honest adversary” 
assumption merely ensures that an adversary follows the protocol, and only tries to 
learn information from messages it received during protocol execution. It is still 
possible, however, that the adversary controls more than a single party and might use 
the information it learns from all the parties it controls. 
• Deterministic Encryption Reveals Information: A common misconception is that 
encrypting data, or hashing it, using any encryption system or hash function, keeps the 
data private. The root of the problem is the use of  a deterministic function (be it a hash 
function or a deterministic encrypting scheme such as textbook RSA). One should 
therefore never apply a deterministic function to an item and publish the result. 
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Instead, a semantically secure encryption scheme must be used. Unfortunately, this 
rules out a number of “simple and eficient” protocols that appear in the literature 
(indeed, these protocols are not and cannot be proven secure). 
• Input Dependent Flow: the flow of the protocol (namely, the decision which parts of it 
to execute), must not depend on the private input of the parties. Otherwise, The 
protocolis not secure 
• Security Proofs: It is tempting to prove security by stating what constitutes a “bad 
behavior” or an “illegitimate gain” by the adversary, and then proving that this 
behavior is impossible. Any other behavior or gain is considered benign and one need 
not bother with it. This approach is often easier than the use of simulation based 
proofs. However , it is hard to predict what type of corrupt behavior an adversary 
might take and thus dangerous to disregard any other behavior that we have not 
thought of as useless for the adversary. Indeed, real world attackers often act in ways 
which were not predicted by the designers of the system they attack. It is also hard to 
define what constitutes a legitimate gain by the adversary, and allow it while 
preventing illegitimate or harmful gains. The notion of “harmful” might depend on a 
specific application or a specific scenario, and even then it might be very hard to 
define. So the protocol designers must prove security according to the simulation 
based proof (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009), which prevent any attack which is not possible 
in an idealized scenario. 
3.3.5 Evaluation of the secure multiparty computation technique 
Secure Multiparty Computation enables distributed privacy preserving data mining without 
the trusted third party, Moreover, the secure multiparty computation technique make the 
result of data mining correct without information loss. The shortcoming of the technique is 
the computation and communication overhead of protocol is very high, esperically for the 
large database, which hinder its application in practice. So secure multiparty computation, 
due to its high computational requirement, is most suitable for situations where the number 
of distributed sources is relatively small and the global analysis to be supported can be 
derived by the given set of primitives. 
3.4 A game theoretic approach to privacy preserving data mining 
Game theory has been widely applied in many different domains like economics, finance, 
etc. Recently, it has also been applied for managing distributed computing environment. 
Applications of game theory in secure multi-party computation and privacy preserving 
distributed data mining is relatively new. Kleinberg et al. (1998) proposed a microeconomic 
view of data mining and illustrated how data clustering for customer segmentation in a 
market with two players could be modeled as a two-player game so that the segmentation 
was driven by the objective of deriving best marketing strategies. Kleinberg et al., (2001)  
tried to justify the fairness of disclosing private information as part of a transaction by the 
compensation of gaining better services using a game theoretic approach, for applications 
like marketing survey and collaborative filtering. In addition, there are some recent studies 
based on game theory to address the collusion problem of privacy preserving data mining 
that use secure multiparty computation (Abraham et al., 2006; Kargupta et al., 2007). 
Kargupta et al.(2007) offers a game-theoretic framework for the PPDM problem as a multi-
party game where each party tries to maximize its own objectives, and also presents 
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equilibrium-analysis of such PPDM-games and outlines a game-theoretic solution based on 
the concept of “cheap-talk” borrowed from the economics and the game theory literature. 
4. The collussion behaviors in privacy preserving data mining 
Based on cryptographic techniques and secure multi-party computations, privacy 
preserving protocols or algorithms have been designed for Privacy preserving data mining . 
However, many of these algorithms make strong assumptions about the behavior of the 
participating entities, such as, they assume that the parties are semi-honest, that is, they 
always follow the protocol and never not try to collude or sabotage the process.  
As mentioned in previous works on privacy-preserving distributed mining (Lindell & 
Pinkas, 2002), the participants are assumed to be semi-honest that is rational for distributed 
data mining, but these kind of assumptions fall apart in real life and the collusion of parties 
happen easily to gain additional benefits. For example (Kargupta et al., 2007), the US 
Department of Homeland Security funded PURSUIT project involves privacy preserving 
distributed data integration and analysis of network traffic data from different 
organizations. However, network traffic is usually privacy sensitive and no organization 
would be willing to share their network traffic with a third party. PPDM offers one possible 
solution which would allow comparing and matching multi-party network traffic for 
detecting common attacks, stealth attacks and computing various statistics for a group of 
organizations without necessarily sharing the raw data. However, participating 
organization in a consortium like PURSUIT may not all be ideal. Some may decide to behave 
like a “leach” exploiting the benefit of the system without contributing much. Some may 
intentionally try to sabotage the multi-party computation. Some may try to collude with 
other parties for exposing the private data of a party. 
4.1 The collussion analysis of PPDM based on the game theory 
Applications of game theory in secure multi-party computation and privacy preserving 
distributed data mining is relatively new (Abraham et al., 2006 ; Kargupta et al., 2007). 
Kargupta et al. (2007) argues that large-scale multi-party PPDM can be thought of as a game 
where each participant tries to maximize its benefit by optimally choosing the strategies 
during the entire PPDM process. With  a game theoretic framework for analyzing the rational 
behavior of each party, authors present detailed equilibrium analysis of the well known secure 
sum computation (Clifton et al., 2002b) as an example. A new version of the secure sum is 
proposed as follows and interested readers can find a detailed anysis in Kargupta et al. (2007). 
Secure Sum Computation (Clifton et al., 2002b): Suppose there are n individual nodes 
organized in a ring topology, each with a value , 1,2, ,jv j n= " .It is known that the 
sum
1
n
jj
v v==∑  (to be computed) takes an integer value in the range [0, 1]N − .  
The basic idea of secure sum is as follows. Assuming nodes do not collude, node 1 generates 
a random number R uniformly distributed in the range [0, 1]N − , which is independent of 
its local value 1v . Then node 1 adds R to its local value 1v  and transmits 1( )modR v N+  to 
node 2. In general, for 2,i n= " , node i performs the following operation: receive a 
value 1iz −  from previous node 1i − , add it to its own local value iv and compute its 
modulus N. In other words, 1 1( )mod ( )mod
i
i i i jj
z z v N R v N− == + = +∑ , where iz  is the 
perturbed version of local value iv to be sent to the next node i + 1. Node n performs the 
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same step and sends the result nz  to node 1. Then node 1, which knows R, can subtract R 
from nz to obtain the actual sum. This sum is further broadcasted to all other sites. 
Collusion Analysis (Kargupta et al., 2007): it can be shown that any iz has an uniform 
distribution over the interval [0, 1]N −  due to the modulus operation. Further, any iz and 
iv  are statistically independent, and hence, a single malicious node may not be able to 
launch a successful privacy-breaching attack. Then how about collusion? 
Assume that there are ( 2)k k ≥  nodes acting together secretly to achieve a fraudulent 
purpose. Let iv be an honest node who is worried about her privacy. We also use iv  to 
denote the value in that node. Let 1iv − be the immediate predecessor of iv and 1iv +  be the 
immediate successor of iv . The possible collusion that can arise are: 
• If 1k n= − , then the exact value of iv  will be disclosed. 
• If 2k ≥ and the colluding nodes include both 1iv − and 1iv + , then the exact value of 
iv will be disclosed. 
• If 1 2n k− > ≥   and the colluding nodes contain neither 1iv − nor 1iv + , or only one of 
them, then iv is disguised by 1n k− − other nodes' values. 
The first two cases need no explanation. Now let us investigate the third case. Without loss 
of generality, we can arrange the nodes in an order such that 
1 2 1
, n kv v v − −" are the honest 
sites, iv is the node whose privacy is at stake and 1,i i kv v+ +" form the colluding group. We 
have 
N
1
1 1
n k i k
j i j
j j id e n o te d b y Y
d e n o te d b y X d e n o te d b y W
v v v v
− − +
= = +
+ = −∑ ∑
	
 	 

 
where W is a constant and is known to all the colluding nodes. Now, it is clear that the 
colluding nodes will know iv is not greater than W, which is some extra information 
contributing to the utility of the collusions. To take a further look, the colluding nodes can 
compute the posteriori probability of iv and further use that to launch a maximum a 
posteriori probability (MAP) estimate-based attack. It can be shown that, this posteriori 
probability is: 
( )( 1)( 1)
( 1) ( )( 1) 1
0
1
( ) ( 1)
( 1)( 1)
r
r j m tn kj
posterior i j n k r j m t
j
f v c c
m n k
− + +− −
− − + − + + −
=
= × − ×+ − − ∑  
where ,
1
i
i
W v
v W r
m
−⎢ ⎥≤ = ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦  and ( 1)1
i
i
W v
t W v m
m
−⎢ ⎥= − − +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦ . When , ( ) 0i posterior iv W f v> = . 
Due to space constraints, we have not included the proof of this result here.  
Game Analysis (Kargupta et al., 2007): In a multi-party PPDM environment, each node has 
certain responsibilities in terms of performing their part of the computations, 
communicating correct values to other nodes and protecting the privacy of the data. 
Depending on the characteristics of these nodes and their objectives, they either perform 
their duties or not, sometimes, they even collude with others to modify the protocol and 
reveal others' private information. Let iM denote the overall sequence of computations node 
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i has performed, which may or may not be the same as what it is supposed to do defined by 
the PPDM protocol. Similarly, let iR be the messages node i has received, and iS he 
messages it has sent. Let iG  be a subgroup of the nodes that would collude with node i. The 
strategy of each node in the multi-party PPDM game prescribes the actions for such 
computations, communications, and collusions with other nodes, i.e., ( , , , )i i i i iM R S Gσ = . 
Further let , ( )i m ic M be the utility of performing iM , and similarly we can define 
, , ,( ), ( ), ( )i r i i s i i g ic R c S c G . Then the overall utility of node i will be a linear or nonlinear 
function of utilities obtained by the choice of strategies in the respective dimensions of 
computation, communication and collusion. Without loss of generality, we consider an 
utility function which is a weighted linear combination of all of the above dimensions: 
, , , , , , , ,({ , }) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i m i m i i s i s i i r i r i i g i g iu c M c S c R c Gσ σ ω ω ω ω− = + + +  
where , , , ,, , ,i m i s i r i gω ω ω ω  represent the weights for the corresponding utilityfactors. Note 
that we omitted other nodes' strategies in the above expression just for simplicity.  
In secure sum computation, the derived posteriori probability can be used to quantify the 
utility of collusion, e.g.,  
           
1
( ) Pr ( )
1
i posterior ig v Posteriori ior f v
m
= − = − +  
We see here that this utility depends on iW v− and the size of the colluding group k. Now 
we can put together the overall utility function for the game of multi-party secure sum 
computation: 
, , , , , , ,({ , }) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i i m i m i i s i s i i r i r i i g j
j P G
u c M c S c R g vσ σ ω ω ω ω−
∈ −
= + + + ∑  
where P is the set of all nodes and iG is the set of nodes colluding with node i. 
Now considering a special instance of the overall utility where the node performs all the 
communication and computation related activities as required by the protocol. This results 
in a function: ,({ , }) ( )
i
i i i i g j
j P G
u g vσ σ ω−
∈ −
= ∑ , where the utilities due to communication and 
computation are constant and hence can be neglected for determining the nature of the 
function. Through studying the plot of the overall utility of multi-party secure sum as a 
function of the distribution of the random variable iW v− and the size of the colluding 
group k, it shows that the utility is maximum for a value of k that is greater than 1. Since the 
strategies opted by the nodes are dominant, the optimal solution corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium. This implies that in a realistic scenario for multi-party secure sum computation, 
nodes will have a tendency to collude. Therefore the non-collusion (k = 1) assumption of the 
classical secure multi-party sum is sub-optimal.  
From the above analysis we can see, the collusion of parties happen easily to gain additional 
benefits in multi-party privacy preserving data mining, because the strategies of following 
protocol is not always optimal. Based on the penalty mechanism without having to detect 
collusion, a cheap-talk protocol is proposed to offer a more robust process,and the optimal 
strategy is to following the protocol for secure computation with punishment strategy. 
In a word, the semi-honest adversarial model is often a realistic one (Lindell & Pinkas ,2002), 
but it sometimes deviate from the real-life application of privacy preserving distributed data 
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mining, so it will a new trend for privacy preserving data mining is to make the collusion 
resistant protocols or algorithms algorithm work well in real life. Recent research have 
addressed this issue, and collusion resistant protocols or algorithms based on penalty 
function mechanism, the Secret Sharing Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold 
Cryptography are given. 
4.2 Collusion resistant protocols based on penalty function mechanism 
For distributed privacy preserving data mining, to achieve a Nash equilibrium with no 
collusions, the game players can adopt a punishment strategy to threaten potential 
deviators. Kargupta et al., (2007) design a mechanism to penalize colluding nodes in 
various ways: 
1. Policy I: Remove the node from the application environment because of protocol 
violation. Although it may work in some cases, the penalty may be too harsh since usually 
the goal is to have everyone participate in the process and faithfully contribute to the data 
mining process. 
2. Policy II: Penalize by increasing the cost of computation and communication. For example, 
if a node suspects a colluding group of size k′ (an estimate of k ), then it may split the every 
number used in a secure sum among kα ′ different parts and demand kα ′ rounds of secure 
sum computation one for each of these kα ′ parts, here 0α > is a constant factor. This increases 
the computation and communication cost by kα ′ fold. This linear increase in cost with respect 
to k′ , the suspected size of colluding group, may be used to counteract possible benefit that 
one may receive by joining a team of colluders. The modified utility function is given by 
({ , }) ({ , })i i i i i i i pu u kσ σ σ σ ω α− − ′= − ∗ .The last term in the equation accounts for the penalty due 
to excess computation and communication as a result of collusion. 
The new secure sum with penalty (SSP) protocol is as follows (Kargupta et al., 2007): 
Consider a network of n nodes where a node can either be good (honest) or bad (colluding). 
Before the secure sum protocol starts, the good nodes set their estimate of bad nodes in 
the network 0k′ = and bad nodes send invitations for collusions randomly to nodes in the 
network. Every time a good node receives such an invitation, it increments its estimate of 
k′ . Bad nodes respond to such collusion invitations and form collusions. If a bad node 
does not receive any response, it behaves as a good node. To penalize nodes that collude, 
good nodes split their local data into kα ′ random shares. This initial phase of 
communication is cheap talk in our algorithm. The secure sum phase consists of 
( )O kα ′ rounds of communication for every complete sum computation. This process 
converges to the correct sum in ( )O n kα  time. Note that, the SSP protocol does not require 
detecting all the colluding parties. Raising k′ based on a perception of collusion will do. If 
the threat is real, the parties are expected to behave as long they are acting rationally to 
optimize their utility. 
4.3 Collusion resistant protocols based on the secret sharing technique 
Now, we are particularly interested in the mining of association rule in a scenario where the 
data is vertically distributed among different parties. To mine the association rule, these 
parties need to collaborate with each other so that they can jointly mine the data and 
produce results that interest all of them. And we will provide a secure, efficient and 
collusion resistant distributed association rules mining algorithm based on the Shamir’s 
secret sharing technique (Shamir,1979). 
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4.3.1 Shamir’s secret sharing technique 
Shamir’s secret sharing method (Shamir,1979) allows a dealer D to distribute a secret value 
sv  among n peers 1 2, , nP P P" , such that the knowledge of any ( )k k n≤  peers is required to 
reconstruct the secret. The method is described in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1( Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm):  
Require: sv : Secret value, 
P: Set of parties 1 2, , nP P P"  to distribute the shares, 
k : Number of shares required to reconstruct the secret. 
1: Select a random polynomial 
1 1
1 1 k-1( ) ,where a 0, (0)
k
k s sq x a x a x v q v
−
−= + + + ≠ =" . 
2: Choose n  publicly known distinct random values 1 , nx x"  such that 0ix ≠ . 
3: Compute the share of each peer, iP , where ( )i ishare q x= . 
4: for 1i =  to n  do 
5:  Send ishare  to peer iP . 
6: end for. 
Shamir’s method is information theoretically secure, in order to construct the secret value 
sv , at least k shares are required to determine the random polynomial ( )q x  of degree 1k − , 
so the complete knowledge of up to 1k −  peers does not reveal any information about the 
secret. 
4.3.2 Privacy-preserving distributed association rule mining problem 
Party 1 2, , nP P P"  have private data set 1 2, , , nDB DB DB"  respectively, and 
, ,i jDB DB for i j n∩ = Φ ∀ ∈ . The data set 1 2, , , nDB DB DB"  forms a database DB , namely 
1 2 nDB DB DB DB= ∪ ∪"∪ , let N denote the total number of transactions for each data set. 
The n parties want to conduct association rule mining on 1 2 nDB DB DB DB= ∪ ∪"∪  and 
find the association rule with support and confidence being greater than the given 
thresholds.  
During the mining of association rule, we assume all parties follow the protocol, and the 
object of the paper is to propose a protocol of distributed association rules mining in 
vertically partitioned data based on the Shamir’s secret sharing technique (Shamir,1979), 
which can prevent effectively the collusion behaviors and conduct the computations across 
the parties without compromising their data privacy, simultaneously, the security of the 
protocol refer to semantic security (Goldreich, 2001).  
4.3.3 Distributed association rule mining algorithm 
In order to learn association rule, one must compute confidence and support of a given 
candidate itemset, and given the values of the attributes are 1 or 0, to judge whether a 
particular itemset is frequent, we only need to find out the number of records (denote 
c.count) where the values for all the attributes in the itemset are 1. if c.count Ns%≥ ，then 
the candidate itemset is the frequent itemset. The following is the algorithm to find frequent 
itemsets: 
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Algorithm 2: The algorithm to find frequent itemsets 
1. { }1 large 1_L itemsets=  
2. for 1( 2; ; )kk L k−= ≠ Φ + +  do begin 
3. 1apriori-gen( )k kC L −=   
4. for all candidates kc C∈  do begin 
5. if all the attributes in c are entirely the same party that party  
 independently compute c.count 
6. else  
collaboratively compute c.count (We will show how to compute it in  
 Section 4.3.) 
7. end 
8. { . min sup}k kL L c c count= ≥∪  
9. end 
10. Return k kL L= ∪  
 
In step 3, the function 1apriori-gen( )k kC L −=  can generate the set of candidate itemsets kC , 
which is discussed in (Agrawal & Srikant, 1994). Given the counts and frequent itemsets, we 
can compute all association rules with support minsup≥ . 
In the procedure of association rule mining, step 1, 3, 6 and 8 require sharing information. In 
step 3 and 8, we use merely attribute names, in step 1, to compute large 1-itemsets, each 
party elects her own attributes that contribute to large 1_ itemsets , where only one attribute 
forms a large 1-itemset, there is no computation involving attributes of other parties, 
therefore, data disclosure across parties is not necessary. At the same time, since the final 
result k kL L= ∪  is known to all parties, step 1, 3 and 8 reveal no extra information to either 
party. However, to compute c.count in step 6, a computation accessing attributes belonging 
to different parties is necessary. How to conduct these computations across parties without 
compromising each party’s data privacy is the challenge we are faced with. If the attributes 
belong to different parties, they then construct vectors for themselves attributes, for 
example, for the some candidate itemset, party iP  have p attributes 1 2, , , pa a a" , then  party 
iP  can construct vector iA , the jth element denote 1
p
i j kk
A a==∏ in vector iA . 
Subsequently, they can apply our secure algorithm to obtain c.count, which will be discussed 
in Section 4.3.4  
4.3.4 Privacy-preserving algorithm to collaboratively compute c.count  
The fact that the distributed parties jointly compute c.count without revealing their raw data 
to each other presents a great challenge. In this section, we show how to privately compute 
c.count based on Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm (Shamir, 1979) for the case of multiple 
parties without revealing the secret values to others.  
Without loss of generality, assuming party 1P  has a private vector 1A , party 2P  , a private 
vector 2A ,…, and party nP , a private vector nA , we use i jA  to denote the jth element in 
vector iA , the value of i jA  is the attribute value of the iP in the jth transaction of the 
database. Given that the absence or presence of an attribute is represented as 0 or 1, the 
value of i jA is equal to 0 or 1, for example (1, 0, 1 ,1 0)
T
iA = " . 
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Assuming all parties follow the algorithm and do the computations honestly, the whole 
process is summarized in Algorithm 3. 
 
Algorithm 3: Privacy-Preserving Algorithm to Collaboratively Compute c.count 
Require: P: Set of parties 1 2, , nP P P" . 
i jA : Secret value of iP , 
X : A set of n publicly known random values 1 2, , nx x x" . 
k : Degree of the random polynomial 1k n= − . 
1: for each transaction 1j = to N  do  
2:  for each party iP  ( 1,i n= " ) do  
3:     Select a random polynomial 1 11 1( )
n
i n i jq x a x a x A
−
−= + + +"  
4:     Compute the share of each party tP , where ( , ) ( )i j t i tsh A P q x=  
5:          for 1t = to n do 
6:              Send ( , )i j tsh A P  to party tP  
7:    Receive the shares ( , )i j tsh A P  from every party tP . 
8:    Compute 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i n iS x q x q x q x= + + +"  
9:        for 1t =  to n do 
10:           Send ( )iS x  to party tP  
11:    Receive the results ( )iS x  from every party iP . 
12:    Solve the set of equations to find the sum 
1
n
i ji
A=∑ of secret values 
13:    if the
1
n
i ji
A n= =∑ , let 1jm = , otherwise 0jm = . 
14: Each party computes
1
.
N
jj
c count m==∑ . 
4.3.5 Analysis of the privacy-preserving algorithm to obtain c.count  
In this section, we give the correctness, complexity and security analysis of the privacy-
preserving algorithm 3. 
Correctness Analysis:Assuming party iP  has a private vector iA , so for arbitrary 
transaction j  in database DB , party iP  has a private value i jA , according algorithm 3, the 
sum 
1
n
i ji
A=∑ of secret values is the constant term of the sum polynomial 
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nS x q x q x q x= + + +" , so we need to solve the following liner equations:  
 
 
1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 11
1 2
1 2 2 2 1 2 21
1 2
1 2 1 1
( )
( )
( )
nn n
n n i ji
nn n
n n i ji
nn n
n n n n n i j ni
b x b x b x A s x
b x b x b x A s x
b x b x b x A s x
− −
− − =
− −
− − =
− −
− − =
⎧ + + + + =⎪⎪ + + + + =⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + + + =⎪⎩
∑
∑
∑
"
"
""
"
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Noted that there are n unknown coefficients and n equations, determinant of  
coefficient 
1 2
1 1 1
1 2
2 2 1
1 2
1
1
1
n n
n n
n n
n n n
x x x
x x x
D
x x x
− −
− −
− −
=
"
"
# # " # #
"
 is the Vander monde determinant，when 
1
( ) 0i j
j i n
D x x
≤ ≤ ≤
= − ≠∏ , that is i jx x≠ , the equations has a unique solution, and each party 
iP  can solve the set of equations and determine the value of 1
n
i ji
A=∑ , however it cannot 
determine the secret values of the other parties since the individual polynomial coefficients 
selected by other parties are not known to iP . If 1 2, , ,j j n jA A A" are all equal to 1, that 
is
1
n
i ji
A n= =∑ , this means the transaction has the whole attributes and supports the 
association rule, we let 1jm = . Otherwise, if some attributes of 1 2, , ,j j n jA A A" are not 
equal to 1, that is,
1
n
i ji
A n= ≠∑ , this means the transaction has not the whole attributes and 
does not support the association rules, we let 0jm = . To compute the number of 
transactions which support the association rule, we only count the number of 1jm = , then 
1
.
N
jj
c count m==∑ , so the algorithm 3 can compute c.count correctly under the condition of 
all parties doing the computations honestly during the mining of association rule.  
Complexity Analysis:Assuming there are N transactions and n parties, the communication 
cost is 2 ( 1)n n − from step 5,6 and step 9,10 of algorithm 3, so the communication cost of 
algorithm 3 is 2 ( 1)Nn n − . 
The following contribute to the computational cost of each transaction: (1) the generation of 
the random polynomial ( ) , 1,iq x i n= " from step 3; (2) the total number of 2n computations 
on the share of each party from step 4; (3) the total number of ( 1)n n −  additions from step 8; 
(4) the computational cost of solving the set of equations to find the sum 
1
n
i ji
A=∑ of secret 
values from step 12; (5)the computational cost of letting 1 0jm or=  according the sum 
1
n
i ji
A=∑ from step 13. 
Compared to the other technique, for example, commutative encryption and secure multi-
party computations, although these techniques are very secure, the excessive computation 
and communication cost associated render them impractical for scenarios involving a large 
number of parties. However the algorithm proposed by our paper is scalable in terms of 
computation and communication cost, and therefore it can be run even when there is a large 
number of parties involved. So our algorithm is efficient and practical. 
Security Analysis: Proposition 1: Algorithm 3 is semantic security (Goldreich, 2001) for the 
network attackers.  
Proof: A network attackers listening to the network traffic of the parties cannot learn any 
useful information, such as the private values or the sum of those values, expect for all the 
shares and the intermediate values, however these values cannot be used to determine the 
coefficients of the sum polynomial and each party’s secretly random polynomial without 
knowing random values 1 2, , nx x x"  for which the intermediate results are calculated, and it 
can not be concluded whether the transaction is support the association rule.  
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Proposition 2: Algorithm 3 is semantic security and can prevent effectively the collusion 
behaviors for the collaborative parties under the condition of the number of the collusion 
parties 1t n< − . 
Proof: Firstly, algorithm 3 is semantic security for the collaborative parties. Compared with 
the network attackers, the collaborative parties know random values 1 2, , nx x x" . At 
algorithm 3, iP  computes the value of its polynomial at n points as shares, and then keeps 
one of these shares for itself and sends the remaining 1n − shares to other parties, so if the 
collaborative party gets all other parties shares and intermediate values through listening to 
the network traffic of the parties, except for the value of the corresponding sum polynomial 
at n different points, he can get, for example, the value of that party iP ’s secretly random 
polynomial at 1n − different point 1 1 1, , , , ,i i nx x x x− +" " . And because the degree of each 
party iP ’s secretly random polynomial is 1k n= − and have n unkown coefficients, in order 
to compute the coefficients of the corresponding party iP ’s secretly random polynomial and 
get the party iP ’s private value, the value at n different points are needed, so party iP ’s 
private value can not be achieved. 
Secondly, algorithm 3 can prevent effectively the collusion behaviors for the collaborative 
parties under the condition of the number of the collusion parties 1t n< − . If there are 
1n − parties collusion, for example, 2 , nP P" , they can get the value 1( )s x of sum polynomial 
at 1x and 1 2 1( ), , ( )nq x q x" which is the value of party 1P ’s secretly random polynomial 
1( )q x at 1n − different points 2 , nx x" , note that 1 1 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nS x q x q x q x= + + +"  , so they 
can compute 1 1 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nq x S x q x q x= − − −" , then can conclude the party 1P ’s private 
value through solving the following liner equations: 
4.4 Collusion resistant protocols based on the homomorphic threshold cryptography 
Now we have known homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption often are used as 
basic building blocks of secure computation protocols for PPDM. In this section , we will 
study the privacy preserving distributed association rule mine problem(§4.3.2) base on 
homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption, where homomorphic encryption and 
threshold decryption can refer to §3.3.3. 
In order to learn association rule, we should find frequent itemsets, Algorithm 2 give how to 
find frequent itemsets, where the key step is step 6 (compute c.count) . How to conduct 
these computations across parties without compromising each party’s data privacy is the 
challenge we are faced with. If the attributes belong to different parties, they then construct 
vectors for themselves attributes, for example, for the some candidate itemset, party iP  have 
p attributes 1 2, , , pa a a" , then  party iP  can construct vector iA , the jth element denote 
1
p
i j kk
A a==∏ in vector iA . Subsequently, they can also apply our secure algorithm to obtain 
c.count, which will be discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
4.4.1Collusion resistant protocol based on the homomorphic threshold cryptography 
The fact that the collaborative parties jointly compute c.count without revealing their raw 
data to each other presents a great challenge. In this section, we develop secure protocol to 
compute c.count for the case of multiple parties. Without loss of generality, assuming Party 
1P  has a private vector 1A , Party 2P  , a private vector 2A ,…, and Party nP , a private 
vector nA . we use i jA  to denote the jth element in vector iA , so the value of i jA is the 
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attribute value of the iP in the jth transaction of the database. Given that the absence or 
presence of an attribute is represented as 0 or 1, the value of i jA is equal to 0 or 1, for 
example (1, 0, 1 ,1 0)TiA = " . 
1. 1 2, , nP P P"  perform the following: 
a. 1 2, , (1 )tP P P t n≤ ≤"  jointly generate a threshold cryptographic key pair 
1 2( ( , , , ), )td d d d e"  of a homomorphic encryption scheme. That is, a secret key 
associated with a single public key is distributed among a group of parties. For 
simplicity and without loss of generality，let t n= , then only if all parties cooperate, 
can they decrypt the ciphertext and prevent the collusion of parties. Let ( )e ⋅ denote 
encryption and ( )id ⋅ denote party i decryption. Meanwhile, the threshold cryptographic 
key pair 1 2( ( , , , ), )td d d d e"  is semantic security. They also generate the number, X, 
where X is an integer which is more than n. 
b. 1P  generates a set of random integers 1 1 1 2 1, , , NR R R"  and sends 
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1( ), ( ), , ( )N Ne A R X e A R X e A R X+ + +"  to nP ; 2P generates a set of random 
integers 2 1 2 2 2, , , NR R R"  and sends 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( ), ( ), , ( )N Ne A R X e A R X e A R X+ + +"  
to nP ;… 1nP −  generates a set of random integers ( 1) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1), , ,n n n NR R R− − −"  and sends 
( 1) 1 ( 1) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 2 ( 1) ( 1)( ), ( ), , ( )n n n n n N n Ne A R X e A R X e A R X− − − − − −+ + +" to nP ; nP  generates a 
set of random integers 1 2, , ,n n n NR R R"  and encrypts his private vector 
 
1 1 2 2( ), ( ), , ( )n n n n n N n Ne A R X e A R X e A R X+ + +"  
c. nP  computes: 
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) )
n n
n n
E e A R X e A R X e A R X
e A A A R R R X
= + × + × × +
= + + + + +
"
" "   
 
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) )
n n
n n
E e A R X e A R X e A R X
e A A A R R R X
= + × + × × +
= + + + + +
"
" "  
……………… 
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) )
N N N N N n N n N
N N n N N N n N
E e A R X e A R X e A R X
e A A A R R R X
= + × + × × +
= + + + + +
"
" "  
 
d. nP  randomly permutes 1 2, , , NE E E"  and obtains the permuted sequence 
1 2, , , ND D D"  . 
e. From computational balance point of view, nP  divides 1 2, , , ND D D"  into n  parts with 
each part having approximately equal number of elements. 
f. nP  decrypts using himself private key nd and sends 1 2 /( ), ( ), , ( )n n n N nd D d D d D"  to 
1nP − ; 1nP − decrypts 1 1 1 2 1 /( ), ( ), , ( )n n n n n n N nd d D d d D d d D− − −" , send it to 2nP − ,…, 1P ; 1P  
decrypts 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 / /( ) , ( ) , , ( )n n n n n n N n N nd d d d D M d d d d D M d d d d D M− − −= = =" " " " ;  
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g. nP  decrypts using himself private key nd and sends  
 
/ 1 / 2 2 /( ), ( ) , , ( )n N n n N n n N nd D d D d D+ + "  to 1nP − ; 1nP − decrypts 
1 / 1 1 / 2 1 2 /( ), ( ) , , ( )n n N n n n N n n n N nd d D d d D d d D− + − + −" , sends it to 2nP − ,…, 3 1 2, ,P P P , 
2P  decrypts 
2 1 3 1 / 1 / 1 2 1 3 1 / 2 / 2
2 1 3 1 2 / 2 /
( ) , ( ) , ,
( )
n n N n N n n n N n N n
n n N n N n
d d d d d D M d d d d d D M
d d d d d D M
− + + − + +
−
= =
=
" " "
" ; 
 
h. Continue until nP  decrypts using himself private key nd and sends 
( 2 ) 1 ( 2) 2 ( 1)
( ), ( ), , ( )
n N nn n n N n n n N n
d D d D d D− + − + −"  to 2nP − , 2nP − decrypts and sends it to 
3nP − ,…, 2 1 1, , nP P P −  , 1nP − decrypts 
 
( 2 )1 1 2 2 1 ( 2) 1 1 1 2 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 2
1 1 2 2 ( 1) ( 1)
( ) , ( ) , ,
( )
n N nn n n n N n n n n n N n n N n
n n n n N n n N n
d d d d d D M d d d d d D M
d d d d d D M
−− − + − + − − − + − +
− − − −
= =
=
" " "
"  
 
i. nP  sends ( 1) 1 ( 1) 2, , ,n N n n N n ND D D− + − + "  to 1nP − , 1nP − decrypts  
1 ( 1) 1 1 ( 1) 2 1( ), ( ) , , ( )n n N n n n N n n Nd D d D d D− − + − − + −" , sends it to 2nP − ,…, 2 1, , nP P P  
nP decrypts 
1 2 2 1 ( 1) 1 ( 1) 1 1 2 2 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 2
1 2 2 1
( ) , ( ) ,
, ( )
n n n n N n n N n n n n n N n n N n
n n n N N
d d d d d D M d d d d d D M
d d d d d D M
− − − + − + − − − + − +
− −
= =
=
" "
" "  
 
2. Compute c.count 
a. 1 2, , nP P P"  make 1 2, , NM M M"  module X respectively, note that if a decrypted term 
iM  is equal to modn X , it means the values of 1 2, , nP P P" are all 1, then let 1im = , 
otherwise 0im =  For example, if the transaction j is permuted as position i ,then 
1 2 1 2 1 2mod ( ( ) )modi j j n j j j n j j j n jM X A A A R R R X X A A A= + + + + + = + +" " "  
 
Consequently, compare whether each decrypted term modiM X is equal to modn X . If 
yes, then let 1im = , otherwise 0im = . 
b. 1P  computes 1
1
N n
i
i
c m
=
= ∑ , 2P  computes 22
1
N n
i
i N n
c m
= +
= ∑ , …, nP  computes 
( 1) 1
N
n i
i n N n
c m
= − +
= ∑ . 
c. all parties ( 1, 2, , 1)iP i n= −"  encrypted ( )ie c and send it to nP . 
d. nP computes 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )n ne c e c e c e c c c× × = + +" " ,then decrypts 
1 2( ( ))n nd e c c c+ +" and sends it to 1nP − , 1nP −  decrypts 1 1 2( ( ))n n nd d e c c c− + +" and 
sends it to 2nP − ,…, 1P decrypts 1 1 1 2 1 2( ( )) .n n n nd d d e c c c c c c c count− + + = + + =" " " . 
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4.4.2 Analysis of collusion resistant protocol based on the homomorphic threshold 
cryptography  
Correctness Analysis: Assume all of the parties follow the protocol, in which the threshold 
cryptographic system is a additively homomorphic cryptosystem, which enable us to  
get 
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ) 1,2,
i i i i i n i n i
i i n i i i n i
E e A R X e A R X e A R X
e A A A R R R X i n
= + × + × × +
= + + + + + =
"
" " "   
And given X n> , so  
1 2 1 2 1 2mod ( ( ) )modi j j n j j j n j j j n jM X A A A R R R X X A A A= + + + + + = + +" " "  
If 1 2, , ,j j n jA A A" are all equal to 1, this means the transaction has the whole attributes and 
supports the association rule, we let 1im = . Otherwise, if some attributes of 
1 2, , ,j j n jA A A" are not equal to 1, this means the transaction has not the whole attributes 
and does not support the association rules, we let 0im = , to compute the number of 
transactions which support the association rule, we only count the number of 1im = , then  
1 2
1
.
N
n i
i
c count c c c m
=
= + + =∑" . 
Meanwhile, in the protocol, nP permutes , 1,2,iE i N= "  before sending them to other 
parties, permutation does not affect .c count , and summation is not affected by a 
permutation. Therefore, the final .c count  is correct. 
Complexity Analysis:The bit-wise communication cost of this protocol is upper bounded 
by 2 [( 1) ]n N nα − + , where α is the number of bits for each encrypted element. It consist of (1) 
the maximum cost of ( 1)n N− from step 1(b); (2) the maximum cost of ( 1)n N− from step 
1(f)-1(i); (3) the maximum cost of 2n from step 2(c) and 2(d). 
The following contributes to the computational cost: (1) the generation of a threshold  
cryptographic key pair, the integer X and nN random integers (2) the total number of 
nN n+  encryptions; (3) the total number of ( 1)( 1)n N− +  multiplications; (4) the generation 
of permutation function; (5) the total number of N permutations; (6) the total number of 
( 1)n N+ decryptions; (7) the total number of N modulo operations; (8) the total number of 
( 1)n N+  additions; (9) dividing N numbers into n parts. 
Security Analysis:Given that nP  obtains all the encrypted terms from other parties and the 
cryptographic system is a semantic security, the ciphertext does not leak any useful 
information about the plaintext and nP  can not get other useful information of the plaintext 
from the ciphertext. Meanwhile, since the cryptographic system is a threshold cryptosystem, 
those parties will not able to decrypt and get the plaintext unless they cooperate. That is, nP  
will not have access to the original values of other parties without cooperating with those 
parties. As a result, the collusion behaviors can be prevented effectively. 1 2, , nP P P"  in our 
protocol jointly generate a threshold cryptographic key pair 1 2( ( , , , ), )nd d d d e"  of a 
homomorphic encryption scheme, which means the protocol is secure under the condition 
of the number of the collusion parties is less than n. Generally, given 1 2, , (1 )tP P P t n≤ ≤"  
jointly generate a threshold cryptographic key pair 1 2( ( , , , ), )td d d d e"  of a homomorphic 
encryption scheme, which means the protocol is secure under the condition of the number 
of the collusion parties is less than t .     
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Meanwhile, Each party of 1 2 1, , nP P P −"  obtains some plaintexts of all iD . Since iD  are in 
permuted form and those n-1 parties don’t know the permutation function, so they cannot 
know which transaction support the association rule. And each party only knows a part of 
transactions supporting the association rules, which lead to trivial benefit for them. 
5. Conclusion 
Due to the right to privacy in the information ear, privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) 
has become one of the newest trends in privacy and security and data mining research. In 
this chapter, we intrduced the related concepts of privacy-preserving data mining and some 
privacy preserving techniques such as Trust Third Party , Data perturbation technique, 
Secure Multiparty Computation and game theoretic approach. Moreover, we discussed the 
collussion behaviors in privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) and gave the collusion 
resistant protocols or algorithms based on penalty function mechanism, the Secret Sharing 
Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold Cryptography. 
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